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Abstract 
In this paper, I discuss the importance of internal funds for corporate investment among 
financially constrained firms. I use the paper ‘Financing Constraints and Corporate 
Investments’ by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen.as a base for my framework. I focus on a 
specific paper refuting their findings and their response in order to fully understand the 
benefits and costs of the framework. I then apply the original framework to a recent 
sample that covers the Great Recession to see the results of the initial paper are still valid 
today and if the recent recession and elongated recovery had an even more adverse effect 
on financially constrained firms than was previously noted.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been considerable amount of debate among economists about the nature of 
financial constraints. As ‘financially constrained’ is a relative term, researchers have 
found it hard to pinpoint what indicators to use when considering financially constrained 
firms. The definition of financially constrained is just that the firm faces a wedge 
between internal and external sources of finance, which is true for nearly every firm. 
Thus, this traditional definition needs to be explored further  While traditional models of 
investment rely on the assumption that firms can respond to prices set in the capital 
market, this paper relies on a slightly different approach that comes from the first 
significant paper in this topic, ‘Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment’ by 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen in 1978. They discuss the existence of a wedge between 
external and internal finance. In a perfectly competitive market, firms would be 
indifferent between internal and external capital as sources of funds. However, it is 
apparent that we do not live in a perfectly competitive market and many issues can stop 
firms from accessing external funds. These include but are not limited to transaction 
costs, economies of scale and informational asymmetry. Thus, in reality, it is far easier 
for firms to access and use internal finance. This leads to a ‘financial hierarchy’ 
explained in the following section, whereby firms will first exhaust their internal funds, 
then issue debt and finally issue equity. Thus, the availability of internal funds can go 
some way in determining the level of investment undertaken by more financially 
constrained firms. It is on this basis that the paper whose model I am using begins to 
divide firms, on the basis of firms’ dividend payout ratio. This is decided by considering 
that firms facing financial constraints are unlikely to pay out dividends due their internal 
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funds being more valuable than firms not facing financing constraints. By dividing firms 
into categories based on their dividend payout ratio, one can observe the different 
investment-cash flow sensitivities between more financially constrained and less 
financially constrained firms.  
The question addressed in this paper is whether investment-cash flow sensitivity can 
be considered a measure of financial constraint. The paper is organized as follows. While 
the main body of work I am drawing from has already been mentioned, I also look at 
various other papers written on the topic and consider their strengths and weaknesses of 
the base paper. Most importantly, I focus on an argument between Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen and the authors Kaplan and Zingales in the form of papers published between 
1978 and 2000. I then focus on other papers that have influenced my thinking on this 
subject. This is covered in the Literature Review section. The rest of the paper outlines 
my research, results and conclusions based on the results.  
There are some key differences between my paper and the original body of work in 
this topic. While their data is obtained from Value Line for the period 1970-1974, mine is 
obtained from the CRSP/Compustat merged dataset for the period 1998-2013. While the 
original authors believed that their data covered enough years to observe a time-series 
variation, but it was short enough that constrained companies would be allowed to 
mature. My database also covers this aspect. Another notable aspect of this paper is that it 
reflects the period of the Great Recession, 2007-2009. This period and the following 
period allow me to observe a time that firms in general were incredibly financially 
restrained. According to a paper published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in terms of 
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unemployment and long-term unemployment in the recent recession and post-recession 
period, it can be regarded as one of the biggest faced by the United States
1
. Thus, I 
believe the investment-cash flow sensitivity observed during this period must be greater 
than observed in the period 1970-84.  
In my results and conclusion, I find that this belief does not hold true. While my 
results largely followed the framework and ideology of FHP [1987], the coefficients I 
observed were less extreme for the financially constrained and the relatively 
unconstrained. Even during the Great Recession, the importance of internal funds was far 
lower than observed during 1970-1984. This might reflect the development of the market 
as I will go into later. I do find that financially constrained firms are far more dependent 
on internal funds for corporate investment. This holds true especially strongly during the 
recession periods and the entire sample. However, it is interesting to note that in the 
period between recessions, cash flows are far less important in determining corporate 
investments, even in financially constrained firms.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Spotlight on Statistics: The Recession of 2007-2009. 
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf 
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2. Literature Review 
The concept of financial constraint has been part of a heated debate between 
economists for decades. The first paper I examine provides the base for all future 
discussion on this topic.  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1978), from now on referred to 
as FHP [1987], started the discussion on financial constraints. They’re paper ended in the 
result that more financially constrained firms are likely to show higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. Their claims were refuted by Kaplan and Zingales (2000), from now on 
referred to as KZ [2000], who found that firms that appear less financially constrained by 
FHP [1987] actually display higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in the periods 
described in FHP [1987].  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen choose to refute KZ [2000]’s 
findings in a response paper published in 2000, where they cite the weakness of KZ 
[2000]’s assumptions in terms of defining ‘financial constraint’. Much of the work 
published on this topic so far is divided upon the true definition of financial constraint. In 
my literature review, I will consider the primarily these three papers to form a well-
rounded understanding of the primary debate in the relevant literature. Thus, I do a 
detailed analysis of the three papers and then include the other papers that have 
influenced my work in this paper.  
2.1. ‘Financing Constraints and Corporate Investments’, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
  FHP [1987], which is described by KZ [1987] as the father of the literature in this 
subject, begins by discussing the difference between internal and external finance 
between firms. In a perfect capital market, a firm would be indifferent towards these 
sources as the firms leverage is independent of any investment decisions. Firms would 
have equal access to both sources of funds. However, this is not a realistic view of the 
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market. In reality, there is a gap in the cost of internal and external funds that is affected 
greatly by financial factors surrounding the firm. These factors would definitely go into 
the investment decisions of the firms when choosing between raising debt or equity and 
using the company’s existing reserves. In a practical situation, the internal choice has 
significant cost advantages of the external choice of financing.  The more prevalent 
explanation of this is the existence of transaction costs, tax advantages and asymmetric 
information in the markets. Asymmetric information in particular leads to external 
financers being unable to properly evaluate firms and as such, there appears to be a gap 
between external and internal financing. They introduce the concept of financial 
hierarchy, where firms will choose to use internal funding first, followed by raising debt, 
and once their debt raising capacity is fully used they will look to issue new shares.  
FHP [1987] analyzes manufacturing firms in the United States from 1970-84, first 
dividing the firms into six classes by asset size. They then evaluate the usage of debt 
financing and the retention rates of these classes. FHP [1987] uses the dividend payout 
ratio to identify financially constrained firms. The reasoning they give for this is that if 
the difference between external and internal financing is low, firms would be indifferent 
to paying out dividends. However, if the cost advantage is significant, firms facing 
higher costs of external finance should ideally have lower pay-outs and try and maximize 
their low cost internal source of funding. Thus, the investment-cash flow sensitivities in 
these firms should be higher. They classify firms into three classes based on the dividend 
to income ratio, Class 1 average dividend to income ratio of 0.1 for at least ten years. 
Class 2 divides firms that have a ratio between 0.1 and 0.2 over at least 10 years of the 
data set. Class 3 includes the rest of the firms.  They only used firms that have a positive 
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real sales growth over the period 1969-1974. This is due to the fact that firms with little 
or no income are far more unlikely to pay out dividends on the basis that they have very 
low cash balances. They believed that this left the firms that paid out low dividends to 
avoid the costly sources of external finance.  
As expected, class 1 firms had the highest retention ratio and experienced the 
most rapid growth in capital stock. They also indicate that cash flow and investment are 
the most volatile in class 1. In this paper, they use three different types of investment 
models, in my paper; I limit myself to one, i.e. the q-framework. In this methodology 
they use Tobin’s q2, defined as the ratio between the market value of assets and their 
book value, as a replacement for investment opportunities. This goes by the assumption 
that a value-maximizing firm will invest as long as the value of q is greater than 1. The q 
value for firms in classes 1-2 is far greater than those in class 3. In their regression, where 
they use Tobin’s q as a measure of investment possibilities, they find that class 1 firms 
tend to issue shares the most while firms in class 3 tend to issue shares the least. This 
follows the financial hierarchy which considers that class 1 firms would have used up a 
lot of their debt capacity. Finally, they interpret investment-cash flow sensitivities as 
highest in this bracket of firms and lowest in class 3. They find that between 46-55% of 
the variation in investment (based on the time period) is explained by variation in cash 
flows.  
It is important to mention that while they use a q-theory framework initially, they 
move to a Q-theory framework, where they control for tax or capital market 
                                                          
2
 Tobin, James. "A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory." Journal of money, credit and banking 1.1 (1969): 15-29. 
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imperfections. The results of the Q framework remain largely the same; therefore I use q 
as a substitute. They weight both investment and cash flow by capital stock, which I 
intend to do.  
2.2. ‘Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measure of Financing 
Constraints?’ Kaplan and Zingales 
KZ [2000] begins by stating that investment-cash flow sensitivities do not provide 
useful measures of financial constraint. While they state the importance of FHP [1987] in 
its addition to its literature, KZ [2000] also believes that the assumptions underlying FHP 
[1987] were never tested. They focus on the assumption that investment-cash flow 
sensitivities increase monotonically with increasing financial constraint. Their paper 
focusses on the 49 low dividend firms identified in FHP [1987] and adds public news and 
qualitative data along with significant quantitative data to try and get a fuller picture of 
the firms described as constrained. They find that firms could have increased their level 
of investment 85% of the time. Most notably, Hewlett Packard could have increased their 
investment every year and chose to pay out low dividends at the time. This finds an 
inherent flaw in FHP [1987]’s assumption that firms paying out low dividends either had 
low income or faced a high cost of external capital. Hewlett-Packard would have faced 
neither of these issues yet continued to pay low dividends, as defined by FHP [1987].  
In fact, KZ [2000] found that firms classified as less financially constrained 
exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity.  They also believe that there is no reason 
to assume that investment-cash flow sensitivity has a monotonic relationship with 
financial constraints. In fact they state that a multi-period model, precautionary savings 
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motives make it hard to judge investment-cash flow sensitivity. As they use the same 
sample of constrained firms as FHP [1987], they believe that there can be no 
disagreement that they have adversely selected their sample. They cite Regulation S-K, 
which requires firms to disclose whether or not they are able to fund their existing 
investment opportunities, as reasoning behind their quantitative research being sound. 
They then divide the firms further into five sub-groups, not financially constrained 
(NFC), likely not financially constrained (LNFC), possibly financially constrained (PFC), 
likely financially constrained (LFC) and financially constrained (FC). Firms were placed 
in the NFC group initiated or increased dividends, repurchased stock or stated that they 
had more liquidity than they require in their 10-K.   While they entertain the possibility of 
management misreporting, but dismiss it on the grounds of Regulation S-K, the length of 
the period and their reading of the financial statements. They find that 85% of firm years 
fall into the LNFC or NFC categories. They find nineteen firms are never constrained and 
twenty-two firms are likely constrained at least one year. They see this as refuting FHP 
[1987]’s hypothesis that these firms were financially constrained in the first place. They 
also observe the median level investment falls as firms become more financially 
constrained. When considering the financial structure of the firms, they observe that 
EBITDA, the debt to total capital ratio and the interest coverage ratio falls monotonically 
across the classifications. Finally, they also see cash and slack (the sum of cash and 
unused credit lines) fall across the firms.  
They then regress the investment to the cash flow in each classification. What 
they find is the opposite effect of FHP [1987], firms investment-cash flow sensitivities 
actually decline as the firms become more financially constrained. NFC or LNFC firms 
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have a sensitivity of 0.702 while LFC or FC firms only had a sensitivity of 0.180.  In 
order to account for firms underreporting negative turns in the financial future of the 
firms, they include PFC in the second group and find that their result is insignificantly 
different from that of Class 3 firms described in FHP [1987] above (0.25). They then 
divide their data into sub periods and find the results hold stronger within the sub periods.  
In further recessions, they estimate the investment-cash flow sensitivities for the 
25% of sample firms who’s interest coverage ratio does not fall below 2.5 and 4.5 times 
and have never restricted dividends. This is something I can replicate in my study as there 
were severe recessions in my time period as well, thus I will be able to analyze the high 
interest coverage firms in my sample. In the case of KZ [2000], they find that these firms 
have very high investment-cash flow sensitivities when compared to the entire sample. 
They go on to test in multiple situations, using both qualitative and quantitative factors. 
They include Tobin’s q, a dummy variable if the firm was breaching debt covenants 
preventing them from paying dividends and the sales to capital ratio in the following 
regressions. Despite controlling for several factors, they continue to find the same 
opposing patterns to that of FHP [1987]. They also regress internal funds to investments 
but their results are insignificant. Interestingly, they divide investment internally among 
different forms of investment including property plant and equipment, inventory and the 
sum of capital investment and R&D expenditures. They find the results hold true for all 
forms of investment.  
They conclude that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not well grounded in 
theory to indicate any sort of financial constraint. While the position taken in this paper is 
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biased towards the FHP approach, due to the following response paper, one cannot deny 
that KZ [2000] proved the most significant paper opposing FHP [1987].  
2.3. ‘Investment Cash-Flow Sensitivities Are Useful. A Comment on Kaplan and 
Zingales’, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
This paper, published as a response to KZ [2000], intimated that the method used 
by KZ does not capture the theoretical approach employed in FHP and subsequent 
studies. They also claim that the method used by KZ [2000] in identifying constraints is 
inherently flawed. Finally, they conclude that the results of the KZ test are uninformative 
about the usefulness of investment cash flow sensitivities.  
The first issues they raise are with the theoretical model applied in KZ [2000]. 
The model identifies return on investment as F(I), internal financing with a constant 
opportunity cost W, external financing E, and a premium for external funds C(E,k), where 
k is the wedge between internal and external funds. They show that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity can be described by the following equation: 
  
  
  
    
       
 
Where C11 is the supply curve for internal finance and F11 is the slope of the 
investment demand curve. While the paper goes into further discussion regarding KZ’s 
assumptions regarding the second derivative of this equation, what is relevant to the 
discussion is that KZ’s assumptions do not provide any effective critique of FHP because 
it does not use the level of W to classify firms. The FHP framework classifies firms 
according to a priori criteria designed to give differences in the slope of external 
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financing schedule C11, across groups. As is apparent by the equation above, firms 
facing higher levels of C11 should have a larger dI/dW, other things equal. As described 
by the FHP model, unconstrained firms pay-out high dividends. In contrast, financially 
constrained firms exhaust internal funds and finance marginal investment with external 
funds, facing a positive C11. A replacement variable, which is suggested by the paper as 
the method used in Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), who used access to public debt or 
debt rating in order to measure cost of external finance to firms. As firms with a better 
debt rating would have better access to external funds, one could assume a lower C11 for 
these firms. This method would be a good source for future research.  
The paper goes on the raise issues about the classification of firms into five 
categories by KZ [2000]. They dismiss the use of Regulation S-K as any reasoning that 
firms will not manage reporting since firms only have to report on their ability to make 
good on announced investments and not on planned investments. Furthermore, they 
question several quantitative measures used by KZ, They say that KZ ignores the fact that 
companies rely heavily on cash for inventory and accounts receivable, especially for fast-
growing firms. They also intimate that cash stock, unused lines of credit and leverage are 
unreliable measures of the relative degrees of financial constraint. For example, low-debt 
firms can face higher constraints as they may have difficulty in raising debt in the market. 
Also, forward looking firms with risky investments would keep a buffer of cash in case 
the risky investment fails. They believe that a more dynamic view of the capital market is 
required when constructing an investment-cash flow framework. 
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Finally, they question the results obtained by KZ in their research by describing 
the FC firms as possibly financially distressed. Financially distressed firms are unlikely 
to use cash for investment activities. Thus, for the above reasons they conclude that KZ’s 
basic framework was flawed as well as their separation criteria. They cite support from 
other papers and I agree with the description given by FHP. I intend to use their 
framework in my own sample while using the parts of KZ I believe are relevant as 
detailed in the following sections.  
2.4. Other Papers 
While the above papers give me enough to formulate a framework, I looked to more 
recent studies on the topic. In a recent paper titled ‘Financial constraints, asset tangibility 
and corporate investment’ by Almeida and Campello, the authors use investment-cash 
flow sensitivity in order to measure financial constraint. They do not divide firms on the 
basis of constrained or unconstrained but use investment-cash flow sensitivity in order to 
help identify firms. While they do not find a monotonic relationship at high levels of 
asset tangibility, they do find it holds for lower asset tangibility. This follows the intuition 
observed both in FHP [1987] and this paper which show that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is a good measure of use of internal and external funds specifically for 
constrained firms. While it did not hold for high levels of tangible assets, there is no 
doubt that investment-cash flow sensitivity has a place when estimating financial 
constraints.  
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3. Data Sources and Framework 
As my data source, I used the merged CRSP/Compustat files that reports  stock 
returns and the reported accounting figures of multiple active and inactive firms. In order 
to clear my data of firms that were either acquired or in financial distress, I have only 
included active firms. I have also removed firms with an average net loss over the period, 
as these firms would be more likely to use external funds at any rate. In order to specify 
my data within the manufacturing industry, I have used the Standard Industrial 
Classification codes which identify the manufacturing industry as firms with SIC codes 
starting with 20-39. The data taken from CRSP/Compustat pertains to all manufacturing 
firms between the fiscal year 2000 to 2013. This data left me with 1038 firms, which is 
greater than the sample used by FHP, though this makes sense as this is an updated 
sample, it should contain more companies that have come up and consolidated over the 
last three decades.  
I then divide the firms into classes, based on their dividend to income ratio, as 
seen in FHP [1987]. The difference in methodology used here is that in FHP, firms were 
designated classes based on dividend ratio in at least ten years, whereas I use average 
dividend to income ratio. I also remove firms with a negative average payout ratio, as 
they pay out dividends when they have losses. I believe this gives a better picture of the 
firm’s attitude towards dividends, especially in the cash strapped Great Recession period. 
The classification is as follows: 
Class 1: 
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Class 2: 
         
      
     
Class 3: All other firms 
The average also helps control for outlier years, where firm paid unusually high 
dividends on low net income. Class 1 contained 518 firms, many of which had not paid a 
dividend at all in the sample period. Class 2 contains 106 firms. Class 3 contains 414 of 
the firms with a payout ratio higher than 0.2.  
In my paper, I use the q framework used by FHP [1978] in order to estimate the 
relationship between cash flow and investment. In order to calculate q I use the market 
price of a   share of the firm multiplied by the shares outstanding to come up with a 
market value of equity. I then add this to the book value of debt and divide it by total 
assets. This is more similar to the method employed by KZ in their paper, but was not 
refuted by FZ [2000] in their follow up paper. The q variable acts as a proxy for 
investment opportunities. Thus, including q in the equation allows us to view investment-
cash flow sensitivity controlling for future investment opportunity.  For investment, I use 
the sum of Capital Expenditure and Acquisitions to act as the total investment value. For 
cash flow, I use the sum of cash and the net change in cash of the year, in order to display 
the cash available for investments. This is the base of my first regression.  
For my second regression, I divide the firms by time period into three different 
sets; 2000-2003, 2003-2008 and 2008-2013. In this regression, two of the time periods 
contain recessions, while the biggest wedge between external and internal funds is 
expected to be observed in the latter period, as this reflects the difficulty of firms to raise 
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external capital should be adversely affected by the Great Recession. The basic equation 
of my regression follows from FHP [1978]: 
 
   
   
  
   
      +u 
Where I represents investments, which I calculate by adding investment in plant 
and equipment with acquisitions. This is a more complete measure of investment than is 
used in FHP [1987]. CF represents the cash available to the firm during the year. Tobin’s 
q has been explained earlier. Both cash flow and investment are weighted by K, the 
capital stock value. The variables ‘i’ and ‘t’ refer to a specific firm  at a specific point in 
time.  I do not used lagged cash flow as I use the cash available during the year. As the 
relevance of cash flow has already been tested by FHP [1987], I perform a joint 
regression from the start. FHP [1987] regress I/K with the independent variables 
individually and then together. As this only shows that cash flows increase the R^2 
variable, I needn’t include in my regression I will discuss the results of this in the 
following sections.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
The table on Summary statistics can be seen in Appendix A, Table 1. When considering 
the work of FHP [1987], the results of the basic summary statistic are surprising.  
When considering the average amount of debt taken on by firms in different classes, class 
1 has a debt to capital ratio of 39.08%. This is similar to the ratio seen in class 2. Class 3 
however, has a much lower debt to capital ratio of 19.90%. This follows the theory that 
more constrained firms are more likely to use up their debt capital in the financial 
hierarchy than less constrained firms. Thus, class 3 firms are more likely to issue shares 
or look at internal funds in order to get their funding. This can be observed in our sample 
as well. 
What is surprising about the sample is the ratio of Capital Stock to Assets. This remains 
in the range of 50-58% for all classes of firms. The amount of difference is minimal, but 
Class 1, as expected has the lowest ratio at 50.44%. However, Class 2 (57.30%) has a 
higher percentage of Capital Stocks/Assets than Class 3 (53.34%). As this is measure of 
how firms among the classes are funded, one can see that Class 3 firms use internal funds 
the most, considering their ratios. This is consistent with the ideology that Class 3 firms 
are the least constrained.  
When considering the Tobin’s q, it falls between 2 and 2.3 for all classes. Again, class 2 
is observed to have highest average q with class 3 following. While this is surprising, it is 
important to consider that the sample period is during a very difficult financial time and 
thus it is biased to a lower q.  
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4.2 Regressions: Entire Sample and Different Classes 
The results of the regression can be found in Appendix B, Table 1. As mentioned above, I 
use the q investment model, which did not have much difference from the Q model 
described in FHP [1987]. The strategy was to estimate the cash flow’s importance in 
explaining the investment decisions made by companies. Both firm and year effects are 
included.  
The model explains the most variation in Class 1 with an R^2 of 30.33%. As expected, 
R^2 falls as the model moves up classes. This shows the economic significance of the 
fact that cash flows explain less of the variation in investment as firms become less 
financially constrained. The coefficient on cash flows is significant at 1% for all Classes 
and the entire sample. This shows the relevance of cash flows to investing decisions 
made by firms.  
Also conforming to expectations set by FHP [1987], cash flow sensitivity is highest in 
Class 1. The coefficient on Class 1 is over 3 times that of the coefficient in Class 2 and 
over 5 times that of the coefficient in Class 3. This is incredibly relevant as more 
financially constrained firms as described by this model definitely have higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. The investment-cash flow sensitivity in the entire 
sample is 0.34. This is slightly less than the coefficient on Class 1 and significantly more 
than the coefficient on Classes 2 and 3. I discuss the sub-intervals in the following sub-
section.  
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4.3 Regressions: Time Period 
The results of the regression can be found in Appendix B, Table 2. The sub-intervals are 
incredibly helpful when considering investment-cash flow sensitivity over time. In the 
1998-2003, which was subject to the 2001 recession, the R^2 coefficient goes up for 
Class 1 firms. This is expected as firms would be more financially constrained during this 
period and more of their investment would be dependent on cash flows. The coefficient is 
much higher than the sample amount (0.53). This also displays the increasing importance 
of cash flows in periods of financial constraint. The coefficients follow the same trend as 
in the full sample, with investment-flow sensitivity the highest in Class 1 and reducing as 
the classes increase.  The R^2 of the entire sample is higher, which indicates that cash 
flows do play an important role in financially constrained times for firms. 
The results of the regression can be found in Appendix B, Table 3. In the following sub-
interval, 2003-2008, the economy is rebounding before the Great Recession in 2007. The 
R^2 of the entire sample falls significantly to just 6.14%, compared to 25.98% in the 
prior period. Interestingly, the R^2 for Class 2 goes up during this period. As this is a 
period of increased investment, in a less constrained economic environment, the 
coefficients on CF/K are considerably lower for all classes apart from Class 2. This 
follows the theory as firms would depend less on cash flows during less constrained 
times. That being said, the R^2 in this sample is the lowest of all the regressions, 
indicating that in times of economic boom, investment-cash flow sensitivity does not 
prove as vital for investing decisions. This should be reversed in the following period.  
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The results of the regression can be found in Appendix B, Table 4. As expected, the R^2 
of the sample goes up to nearly the same as the period 1998-2003 (25.01%). This proves 
to be no surprise as the Great Recession and the slow recovery happens at this time. The 
coefficients for CF/K are higher for every Class compared to the previous period. This 
follows the idea that firms are more constrained during recessions. A significant 
difference is observed between the coefficients in recession and non-recession time.  
Another point of interest is the variable q. While it is being used as a proxy for 
investment opportunity, the coefficient on all of the regressions is negative. In many 
cases, it is statistically significant up to 1%. The coefficient is even lower during the non-
recession period of 2003-2008.  
The following section highlights my conclusions based on the above results.  
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5. Conclusions 
The results of the tests applied based on the FHP [1987] came out largely as 
expected. During recessions, it is safe to say that cash flows have a large impact on 
investments, especially in Class 1 firms. The most financially constrained group should 
be the most likely to base its investment decisions on the available internal funds and this 
is seen in the results of the test. Class 3 firms have very low coefficients during the entire 
sample, only marginally higher during recessions, thus, the least financially constrained 
firms, depend the least on cash flows in order to make investment decisions. Even during 
recession time, the R^2 on the Class 3 variables is never higher than 3.57%. Comparing 
this to the 35% and 32% that the Class 1 variables have during recessions, it is clear that 
Class 3 firms who pay out high dividends, are far less affected by cash flows when 
considering investments. It is also interesting to note that cash flows influence on 
investment decreases dramatically during periods of investment. The R^2 for the entire 
sample during 2003-2008 is 6.14%, compared to 25.98% during 1998-2003 and 25.01% 
during 2008-2013. This might be due to the fact that debt and equity are easier to raise in 
periods of investment, and firms are far less dependent on internal funds during economic 
boom.  
When considering all four regression tables, it is clear that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity goes some way in explaining the investing decisions of Class 1 firms. This 
affect is diluted for Class 2 firms and further diluted for Class 3 firms. What does this say 
about the wedge between internal and external finance? I believe that it follows the logic 
of FHP [1987] in that Class 1 firms face the highest difference between internal and 
external capital, especially during recession time. It is interesting to note that the 
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importance of internal funds reduces dramatically in non-recession periods. Even though 
internal funds are evidently vital for Class 1 firms during recessions, this effect reduces 
dramatically in the period 2003-2008. At this time, the coefficient on Class 1 firms for 
CF/K is not significantly different from those in Class 2.  
The coefficients I got as a result are far lower than those observed by FHP [1987] 
particularly in Class 2 and 3 firms. This may indicate the falling importance of cash flows 
as a method of funding corporate investments. As the paper is nearly three decades old, it 
suggests that the market over time has improved considerably. Even Class 1 firms in my 
sample, have far lower investment-cash flow sensitivity than the corresponding firms in 
FHP [1987]. Even Class 1 firms are less dependent on internal funds than they were thirty 
years ago. This indicates the growth and development of the market during this time. This 
holds true even during the Great Recession of 2007-2008, largely seen as the worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression. In fact, the results for both the recession 
periods were similar. One would assume that the recession of 2007-2008 and the 
subsequent recovery should have a far larger impact on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
among constrained firms than the recession of 2001-2002. However, this is not what I 
have observed. This could be due to the fact that my model does not take into account the 
intensity of these recessions or that firms are more capable of coping without internal 
funds today.  
Another point of note is the largely negative coefficient on q, with up to 1% 
significance in many cases. One possible explanation is that firms forgo present 
investments in order to invest in the future. Firms that plan huge projects in the future 
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would be more likely to keep a cash buffer against the risk of the investment. Also, the q 
value was not significantly different between the classes. This may indicate that q is a 
poor proxy for investment possibilities. 
In conclusion, my paper’s results and conclusions largely align with FHP [1987] 
for the whole sample and the recession periods. I would say that internal funds go a long 
way in deciding investment choices among the more constrained firms. However, the 
extreme fall of importance of internal funds during 2003-2008 show that cash flows, 
while important, do not tell the complete picture of financing decisions. When 
considering topics for future study, it is vital to consider other measures of financial 
constraint. While dividend payout ratio was consistent with the results found in this paper 
and FHP [1987], there may be other ways to measure financial constraint, Also, it is 
increasingly obvious, that investment-cash flow sensitivity, while a good measure, cannot 
be the only criteria by which constrained firms choose to spend their funds. It would be 
interesting to consider other possibilities, especially among unconstrained firms that may 
lead to firms’ choice between internal and external finance.  
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Appendix A 
Summary Statistics 
This table provides the basic summary statistics for the divisions I make on the basis of the dividend payout ratio. The 
Sample Size refers to the number of firms in each division. Debt/Capital Ratio refers to the average Debt/Capital Stock 
ratio of all the firms within the class. The median value is also displayed. Capital Stock/Assets is the average value of 
Capital Stock/Assets of all the firms within the class. The median value is also displayed. Tobin’s q refers to the 
average value of the q variable of all the firms within the class.  
Divisions Sample  Size Debt/Capital Capital Stock/Assets Tobin's q 
Class 1 
Median 
518 39.08% 
15.85% 
50.44% 
55.35% 
2.08 
  Class 2 106 39.72% 
12.59% 
57.30% 
57.90% 
2.3 
Median 
  Class 3 414 14.90% 
19.88% 
53.34% 
55.34% 
2.15 
Median 
  Total 1038 
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Appendix B 
Regression Tables 
The follow is a key to all the regression tables: 
The dependent variable for all the regressions is I/K, which is investment weighted by the replacement value of capital 
stock. The independent variables are q and C/K. The sample size denotes the number of firms in the sample. The 
coefficient of the independent variable is given on the top row. *, ** and *** denote indicate significance at 10%,5% 
and 1% respectively. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Table 1 
1998-2013 
Group Sample Size  q C/K R^2 
Class 1 518 -0.0014868 0.3763752*** 30.33% 
  (0.0016007) (0.0070125)  
Class 2 106 -0.01976*** 0.114671*** 8.43% 
  (0.0037158) (0.0144592)  
Class 3 414 -0.007163*** 0.0719661*** 2.06% 
  (0.0012507) (0.0148068)  
Total  1038 -0.0028286* 0.3422981*** 22.26% 
  
(0.0010232) (0.0052985) 
 
      
Table 2 
  
1998-2003 
 
 
  Group Sample Size  q C/K R^2 
Class 1 
353 -0.0023066 0.5351715*** 35.64% 
 
 
(0.001888) (0.0158196) 
 Class 2 
90 -0.0208728*** 0.0382134*** 7.35% 
 
 
(0.0048475) (0.0427787) 
 Class 3 
347 -0.0050525*** 0.0562792*** 2.72% 
 
 
(0.0012247) (0.0248056) 
 Total  
790 -0.0026876 0.4798302*** 25.98% 
  
(0.0011521) (0.0115842) 
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Table 3 
  
2003-2008 
 
 
  Group Sample Size  q C/K R^2 
Class 1 
410 -0.0216526*** 0.1622688*** 7.04% 
 
 
(0.0039311) (0 .0149445) 
 Class 2 
98 -0.0297343*** 0.1686028*** 17.28% 
 
 
(0.0070172) 0.0200194 
 Class 3 
376 -0.0355662 0.013762*** 3.57% 
 
 
(0.0059242) (0.0329882) 
 Total  
884 -0.0240996*** 0.1565399*** 6.14% 
  
(0.0029765) (0.0112201) 
  
 
Table 4 
  
2008-2013 
 
 
  Group Sample Size  q C/K R^2 
Class 1 
491 -0.0136773 0.3582456*** 32.48% 
 
 
(0.0066808) (0.0087159) 
 Class 2 
102 -0.0203832** 0.1651259*** 12.37% 
 
 
(0.0080525) (0.0186698) 
 Class 3 
374 -0.0319487*** 0.030934*** 3.38% 
 
 
(0.0043917) (0.0230167) 
 Total  
967 -0.0161372*** 0.3385171*** 25.01% 
  
(0.0046011) (0.0072624) 
   
